On Monday, two Japanese players announced they would file for free agency, Seibu Lions right-hander Kona Takahashi and Lotte Marines lefty Kazuo Ojima. Both will be entering their Year 30 season, with Ojima exercising his rights to that will allow him to sign only with any Nippon Professional Baseball team.
Meanwhile, two more players joined the que to be posted so they can transfer to MLB teams. Joining the Hanshin Tigers’ triple-crown-inning third baseman Teruaki Sato are stocky right-handers Hiromi Itoh of the Nippon Ham Fighters and Takahashi’s teammate, Kaima Taira.
Meanwhile, the Fighters made a long-term commitment to Franmil Reyes, extending him for four years, his agent, Edwin Dominguez-Alvarez, announced Sunday.
Freedom of movement in Japan
Reyes was not eligible for free agency, and there is no exemption for import players from Japan’s cumbersome free agency rules, but imports frequently move wherever they want after their original contracts expire, when Japanese players are tied to the clubs holding their original contracts for seven-to-nine years of major league service time.
Because NPB rules allow all players and teams to attach riders to their standard contracts that restrict teams’ standard rights, virtually every import has a rider with a clause stating housing conditions, airfare for family members to visit them in Japan and the maximum length of service.
This allows imports who negotiate their contracts through agents to move to other clubs when their original terms expire regardless of their free-agent status. Japanese players, too, often have riders that place additional financial and contractual obligations on the team, and these are never made public.
The price of secrecy
That’s why nobody but the player, the team and their relative representatives actually know how much an individual player’s contract value is for any given season. Teams looking to acquire a player from another team will occasionally get sticker shock from discovering how much the player will need to be paid.
Former Fighters chief executive Toshimasa Shimada rejected my hypothesis that the Lotte Marines posted Roki Sasaki due to a contractual obligation. Shimada will forget more about the workings of NPB than I will ever know, but he had no clear explanation for why the Marines would surrender their most valuable player when it made no sense to do so.
Shimada believed the team may have made an oral promise to post Sasaki, but teams have done that before and reneged. In 2004, the Orix Buffaloes publicly promised they would not reserve any Kintetsu Buffaloes player against their wishes from the teams’ merger. Orix then claimed the rights to Kintetsu ace Hisashi Iwakuma against his wishes.
Orix explained its decision by saying, “You can’t expect us to honor such a promise to such a valuable player,” but eventually backed down after a few months and sold Iwakuma to the Rakuten Eagles.
The only way I would buy the “oral agreement” is if Sasaki’s side had it on audio and threatened to make it public. But there is no prohibition against teams making such deals with super-talented amateurs if it means a) not signing them and getting any value at all from them, and b) wasting a first-round pick, since the Yomiuri Giants have made it clear that they will never allow a system that includes compensation picks for unsigned draft choices.
The Giants have blocked moves for compensation draft picks in order to discourage other clubs from pursuing players that have all but agreed to sign with Yomiuri, as was the case when the Fighters wasted top draft picks on outfielder Hisayoshi Chono and Tomoyuki Sugano who refused to sign with them.
That lack of a compensation pick gives a talented amateur even more leverage to cut a deal that backs the team that signs him into a corner.
Had Sasaki moved as a 25-year-old, the Marines might have raked in $50 to $70 million through the current posting system instead of the $1.62 million they actually received.
From the instant the posting system was first agreed to, two teams, the SoftBank Hawks and the Giants, have been vocal opponents. The Hawks are the only team to never make use of it, something that has contributed to their current dynasty, but also something that dissuades some amateurs from signing with them.
Former Yomiuri Shimbun President Tsuneo “Nabetsune” Watanabe, one of Japan’s most vocal hypocrites, decried the posting system from Day 1 as antithetical to the NPB business model Yomiuri has preserved to protect its hegemony at the expense of pro baseball’s overall growth and development.
“We’re not in the business of selling players, and anybody who is shouldn’t be in this business,” Watanabe said. “I’ll release any Giants player who has the temerity to ask to be posted.”
Watanabe also said he would release any player who sent his agent to contract talks. Ace pitcher Koji Uehara did both, forcing Watanabe to make excuses as to why the pitcher wasn’t instantly released. Uehara’s agent, Watanabe explained, was in fact “a friend who was advising the pitcher and not an agent at all.”
The irony
Of course, without Watanabe, there wouldn’t have been a posting system at all. It only became necessary because he threatened to destroy NPB if he wasn’t allowed a free agent system that forced other teams to essentially sell veteran stars to the Giants.
Watanabe forced other teams to swallow that poison pill because, like baseball men on both sides of the Pacific, he bought into the Social Darwinist belief that no Japanese stars in their prime could ever compete in MLB.
When Hideo Nomo took a sledge hammer to that ignorance in 1995, MLB teams began evaluating Japanese free agents. In turn, those Japanese clubs that had reluctantly agreed to lose their veteran stars in exchange for compensation from other NPB teams now faced the prospect of getting nothing in return from MLB teams.
At first, the free agent system worked the way Watanabe anticipated, with Central League stars migrating to the Giants and never switching to the Pacific League, whose stars, as often as not, fled to the CL. But ever since Seiichi Uchikawa abandoned the Yokohama BayStars to return to Kyushu and play in the PL with the Hawks in 2011, that balance has shifted.
When a free agent is not a free agent
Because free agency was “a gift” to the players from the owners, whose arms were twisted by the criminally cynical and hypocritical Watanabe, it is fairly lame. Because there is no minor league free agency and no restriction on how many times a player can be activated to the active major league roster, players can be reserved in Japan’s minors forever.
When a team releases a player from his first pro contract, he is free to sign with any team anywhere in the world. This is what happens when a player is posted. If a player with five years service team leaves to go to MLB and returns to Japan, he is free to sign with any team he likes, but the team that signs him will hold that player’s rights until he has enough service time to file for free agency.
If a minor leaguer without any service time is released, and signs with another team, where he then turns into a star, he still needs a minimum of seven years of major league service time before he can sell his services on the free market, because he hasn’t fulfilled his years of indentured servitude to NPB.
Matsui & the million dollar giveaway
On Monday, we learned that Yuki Matsui would exercise his option to sign on for another two years with the San Diego Padres. As far as I can tell, he is the first Japanese player to do this.
This means the Padres must now cut a check to the Rakuten Eagles for 15 percent of the $13.5 million they have now guaranteed Matsui for the next two years or $2.025 million.
Matsui’s total original deal was worth $58 million, but because it had a three-year opt out, the Padres at first only owed the Eagles $2.9 million.
Had there been no opt-out clause, the Padres would have paid the Eagles $5,525,000 three years ago instead of the $2.9 million San Diego paid then.
Posting fees are calculated as follows:
- 20 percent of up to $25 million
- 17.5 percent of the amount between $25 million and $50 million
- 15 percent of guaranteed money over $50 million and all other money not guaranteed at the time of the initial contract
Because options are “taxed” at the lowest rate and are not paid out until they are exercised, the Matsui deal gave the Padres an interest-free loan of $2.025 million and a total payout $600,000 less than they would have owed Rakuten without any options.
If one estimates a fairly modest 7% return on investment for that figure, the Padres should have received another $455,712 dollars for holding onto the Eagles’ cash for three years.
Add that to the $600,000 they saved up front and simply adding the opt-out to Matsui’s contract turned his deal into a $1 million giveaway from the Eagles to the Padres.